GEORGE MOORE PRINCIPIA ETHICA PDF

His grandfather was the author Dr George Moore. His eldest brother was Thomas Sturge Moore , a poet, writer and engraver. Moore is best known today for his defence of ethical non-naturalism , his emphasis on common sense in philosophical method, and the paradox that bears his name. He was admired by and influential among other philosophers, and also by the Bloomsbury Group , but is unlike his colleague and admirer Russell, who, for some years thought he fulfilled his "ideal of genius" [12] mostly unknown today outside of academic philosophy. He was critical of modern philosophy for its lack of progress , which he believed was in stark contrast to the dramatic advances in the natural sciences since the Renaissance. He was president of the Aristotelian Society from

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It follows that to decide whether a disposition is or is not virtuous involves the difficult causal investigation discussed in section 3 ; and that what is a virtue in one state of society may not be so in another. Thus a the mere unconscious habit of performing duties, which is the commonest type, has no intrinsic value whatsoever; Christian moralists are right in implying that mere external rightness has no intrinsic value, though they are wrong in saying that it is therefore not virtuous , since this implies that it has no value as a means.

Summary of chapter. By an ideal state of things may be meant either 1 the Summum Bonum or absolutely best, or 2 the best which the laws of nature allow to exist in this world, or 3 anything greatly good in itself: this chapter will be principally occupied with what is ideal in sense 3 —with answering the fundamental question of Ethics. In order to obtain a correct answer to the question What is good in itself? If we begin by considering I. But 3 granted that the appropriate combination of these two elements is always a considerable good and may be a very great one, we may ask whether, where there is added to this a true belief in the existence of the object of cognition, the whole thus formed is not much more valuable still.

We thus get a third essential constituent of many great goods; and in this way we are able to justify 1 the attribution of value to knowledge, over and above its value as a means, and 2 the intrinsic superiority of the proper appreciation of a real object over the appreciation of an equally valuable object of mere imagination: emotions directed towards real objects may thus, even if the object be inferior, claim equality with the highest imaginative pleasures.

Finally 4 with regard to the objects of the cognition which is essential to these good wholes, it is the business of Aesthetics to analyse their nature: it need only be here remarked 1 that, by calling them beautiful , we mean that they have this relation to a good whole; and 2 that they are, for the most part, themselves complex wholes, such that the admiring contemplation of the whole greatly exceeds in value the sum of the values of the admiring contemplation of the parts.

With regard to II. Personal Affection, the object is here not merely beautiful but also good in itself; it appears, however, that the appreciation of what is thus good in itself, viz. It follows from what has been said that we have every reason to suppose that a cognition of material qualities, and even their existence, is an essential constituent of the Ideal or Summum Bonum: there is only a bare possibility that they are not included in it.

It remains to consider positive evils and mixed goods. In order to consider II. Hence 1 no actually existing evil is necessary to the Ideal, 2 the contemplation of imaginary evils is necessary to it, and 3 where evils already exist, the existence of mixed virtues has a value independent both of its consequences and of the value which it has in common with the proper appreciation of imaginary evils.

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It follows that to decide whether a disposition is or is not virtuous involves the difficult causal investigation discussed in section 3 ; and that what is a virtue in one state of society may not be so in another. Thus a the mere unconscious habit of performing duties, which is the commonest type, has no intrinsic value whatsoever; Christian moralists are right in implying that mere external rightness has no intrinsic value, though they are wrong in saying that it is therefore not virtuous , since this implies that it has no value as a means. Summary of chapter. By an ideal state of things may be meant either 1 the Summum Bonum or absolutely best, or 2 the best which the laws of nature allow to exist in this world, or 3 anything greatly good in itself: this chapter will be principally occupied with what is ideal in sense 3 —with answering the fundamental question of Ethics.

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